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Why Register Hedge Fund Advisers—
A Comment
Lyman Johnson∗
I. Introduction
Luke Ashworth has weighed in as a young legal scholar on a
subject of exceeding complexity and importance.1 His work does
what a good Note should do in being well-organized, clearly
written, providing useful background, engaging existent
literature, and advancing (and supporting) a thesis grounded in
policy considerations. And Luke’s point of view is as
unmistakable as it is provocative: the much-ballyhooed regulation
of hedge fund advisers adopted in the landmark 2010 Dodd–
Frank legislation2 is wasteful, unnecessary, and should be
modified.
Let me welcome Luke to the scholarly world, and extend to
him the customary return for thoughtful work: a response. My
remarks are designed less to offer critical comments than to place
his subject and his views into a larger context, and to offer my
perspective on why in 2010 we got the fund adviser law we did,
and how that law illuminates larger and longstanding concerns
about the sometimes incongruent investor protection, capital
formation, and public interest goals of U.S. financial regulation.

∗ Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
School of Law, LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas
(Minneapolis) School of Law. The author thanks Professor Wulf Kaal for his
helpful comments.
1. Luther R. Ashworth II, Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary
to Accomplish the Goals of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Title IV?, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 651 (2013).
2. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).

713

714

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713 (2013)
II. Investor Protection

Luke faults the investor protection rationale underlying the
hedge fund adviser registration and disclosure requirements of
Dodd–Frank. He points out that there was already a Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) anti-fraud rule, adopted in
2007,3 and that hedge funds supposedly draw sophisticated
investors who can fend for themselves.4 I think the investor
protection case for the registration requirement is a bit stronger
than Luke believes, although that in turn serves to highlight in
the fund area a question that long has loomed over federal
securities regulation more generally: does mandated information
disclosure always protect investors, is that its real goal,5 and is
advancing that objective always consistent with other worthy
policies? But before briefly making a few points about investor
protection, let me address the seeming incongruity of the
traditional investor protection aim of federal securities law
generally with the specific concerns of Dodd–Frank and the acute
financial crisis that preceded it.
The reason for joining longstanding SEC concerns about
investor protection with the sprawling systemic-financial-risk
regulation of Dodd–Frank is hidden in plain view early in Luke’s
paper. Prior to Dodd–Frank, the SEC had failed for some time in
its efforts to regulate investment pools and their advisers, as it
consistently espoused investor protection in its quest to do so.6
3. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2011).
4. See Ashworth, supra note 1, at 654 (“In sum, hedge fund adviser
registration is unnecessary because (i) there is already an adequate anti-fraud
rule in place; (ii) hedge funds have increased transparency to their investors;
and (iii) hedge funds have a sophisticated investor class that does not need the
same protections provided to ordinary investors.”).
5. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for
a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 721–23 (1984) (providing a
theory in support of a mandatory disclosure system in the securities law realm);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 671–73 (1984) (analyzing “the
functions of legal rules and rules compelling disclosure promulgated by the
national government”).
6. A 2003 SEC Report on hedge funds noted that although the agency had
studied systemic risks associated with hedge funds, the report focused on
investor protection concerns raised by hedge funds. See generally SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS (2003) [hereinafter 2003
SEC REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/news/ studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
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The horrific 2008 crisis, viewed on this issue alone, was an
unexpected and serendipitous regulatory opening, a crisis not to
be wasted by a frustrated administrative agency. After all, more
stringent securities market regulation typically is not adopted in
booming and flush times; it follows on the heels of financial
distress and can be overbroad and too far sweeping.7 In the
aftermath of the historic financial meltdown of 2008–09, with
victims and villains aplenty, and regulatory nuance in short
supply—in contrast to the abundant regulatory shame—who
could be opposed to better investor protection, whether or not
faulty protection of hedge fund investors had really contributed to
the crisis or, by being improved, would prevent another? For the
SEC, the regulatory iron in Congress was hot and so the agency
opportunistically struck, but for a cause it had sought long before
our recent calamity.8 Luke rightly seeks in vain for the
connection between the 2008 crisis and the need for fund adviser
registration on investor protection grounds because there likely is
none. If protection for investors was needed, it was in spite of, not
because of, the crisis. But calculated timing and implausible
policy connection to crisis aside, maybe there still is something to
be said for better protecting fund investors.
Hedge funds and their advisers almost invariably are
organized as limited partnerships or limited liability companies.9
Whether organized in a state in the United States or under the
law of the Cayman Islands, hedge fund vehicles are not
stringently regulated under any of these laws. Under U.S. law,
moreover, notably Delaware, states have adopted a highly
7. For example, Professor Roberta Romano has argued that provisions of
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act were not a focus of “careful deliberation by Congress”
and were “enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media
frenzy involving several high-profile fraud and insolvency cases” combined with
“what appeared to be a free-falling stock market, and a looming election
campaign in which corporate scandals would be an issue.” Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1527 (2005).
8. See 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 88–89 (recommending
regulation of hedge funds by amending the Advisers Act of 1940 as a result of
the SEC’s Hedge Fund Roundtable).
9. See Franklin Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189, 190 (1999) (“[A] hedge fund
can be organized as a limited liability company, [and] most are organized as
limited liability partnerships . . . .”).
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flexible, contractarian approach,10 allowing the fund sponsor to
craft a deal document that contractually specifies investor rights.
If it is not set forth in the partnership or operating agreement,
investors do not have it, including ongoing access to full
information.11 Moreover, the sponsors themselves can reduce or
even eliminate their fiduciary duties, thereby removing even
traditional state law safeguards for egregious adviser conduct.12
It is possible that, as a result of Dodd–Frank, information in
Form ADV,13 filed with the SEC, coupled with on-site agency
examinations, will afford greater transparency to regulators and
investors, deter adviser wrongdoing, and facilitate earlier
discovery of past misconduct.14 This may extend, for example, to
determining: the amount and type of a fund’s leverage, that a
fund’s portfolio assets are of the kind and amount (appropriately
valued) as reported and are safe, whether funds performed as
stated, whether insider trading or other wrongful activity is
engaged in, whether conflicts of interest exist and are handled
appropriately, and so on. Investors may be able to, and perhaps
they should, take better measures to fend for themselves and
10. See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del.
1999) (noting that “the policy of freedom of contract underlies” both Delaware
limited liability companies as well as limited partnerships).
11. For example, section 18-1101 of the Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act reiterates that Delaware gives “maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2012).
12. See generally Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91
B.U. L. REV. 701 (2011).
13. See Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.
sec.gov/answers/form adv.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2013) (“Form ADV is the
uniform form used by investment advisers to register with both the SEC and
state securities authorities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
14. This is a professed SEC objective for the regulation. See Rules
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No.
IA 3221, at 125–30 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Implementing Release],
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3221.pdf. On October 9, 2012, the SEC,
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, sent a letter to newly
registered investment advisers explaining that certain high-risk areas will be
focused on during agency examinations. See Letter from Drew Bowden, Deputy
Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/letter-presence-exams.pdf.
These areas are marketing, portfolio management, conflicts of interest, safety of
client assets, and valuation. Id.

WHY REGISTER HEDGE FUND ADVISERS

717

elicit stronger protections (including monitoring mechanisms),
but a tough financial cop on the beat can also be on the lookout to
head off trouble and to publicly punish (and deter) troublemakers
and thereby can also help to upgrade industry norms.
The preexisting anti-fraud rule noted by Luke likely curbs
some wrongdoing, but it does not mandate the fuller disclosure of
information required by Form ADV, either to investors or the
SEC. And its proscription of misconduct is limited to its quite
general phrasing.15 By analogy, the venerable Rule 10b-516 is not
thought, in its role as an “anti-fraud” rule, to make other
mandated disclosures unnecessary under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.17 That rule supplements but does not
supplant more detailed disclosure obligations.18 Of course, any
disclosure regime—particularly one aimed at an industry that
historically has been opaque and loathes to divulge much
information—runs the risk that information will be “sanitized” to
screen out (or artfully describe) negative information or, due to
lags in reporting, simply be unhelpfully “stale.” Hedge fund
advisers are likely to be cautious in their initial disclosures and
are sure to pay great attention to evolving practices of other
registrants.
And it may be open to serious doubt whether so-called
“sophisticated” or “accredited” investors truly are financially
sophisticated and able to self-help as they are assumed to be. No
doubt fund investors are not as financially illiterate as retail
investors, as was so alarmingly noted in a 182-page study
released by the SEC on August 30, 2012.19 But given the wealth
and income definitions for accredited investors—largely
unaltered over the last thirty years, anyway20—the behavioral
15. For the exact language of the preexisting anti-fraud rule for hedge
funds, see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2011).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2010).
18. See, e.g., id. § 78m (stating various disclosure obligations that certain
issuers of securities, such as publicly-traded companies, must file with the SEC).
19. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL
LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS (Aug. 20,2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf.
20. The original definition of “accredited investor” found in Regulation D
was adopted in 1982. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. It was altered modestly by § 413(a) of
Dodd–Frank to exclude the value of an investor’s primary residence in
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and regulatory premise is that relatively well-off investors must
be considerably more financially astute than the ordinary
investor.21 Yet, although some funds, and certain sectors in
particular, can and do provide mouth-watering gains when
measured over selected periods, on average hedge funds, as an
aggregate investment class, have underperformed risk-free
Treasury bills due to an upsurge in the sheer number of funds
since 2000.22 And many fund investors seem to follow the typical
retail investor strategy of chasing “yesterday’s returns” and
preferring large, well-known funds.23 More information alone, of
course, may do nothing to stop this dynamic, but consistently low
returns over a long enough period may lead to a market solution,
with investors eventually migrating to other asset classes. But it
does suggest that if numerous accredited investors are not
particularly savvy on this front, they may be more susceptible to
wrongdoing than is commonly supposed. And they certainly make
attractive candidates for a good fleecing.24
Even if investor protection is a worthy goal, however, and one
the SEC shrewdly advanced on the coattails of the financial
crisis, Congress has a disturbingly familiar habit of flip-flopping
on the subject. Just two years after investor protection was
injected into the larger systemic risk concerns of Dodd–Frank,
Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act
calculating net worth. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413(a), 124
Stat. 1376, 1577–79 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b).
21. Just as in 1973, Professor Harold Marsh noted the “myth of the ‘expert’
expert,” Harold Marsh, New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Securities
Offerings—A Panel Discussion, 28 BUS. LAW. 505, 527 (1973), so too may we have
a “myth of the ‘sophisticated’ sophisticated” investor.
22. See Fiammetta Rocco, The Success of Hedge Funds: Masterclass,
ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, at 77–78 (noting that although some hedge fund
investors do very well, “on average hedge funds have underperformed even riskfree Treasury bills . . . . [b]ecause the bulk of investors’ capital has flooded in
over the past ten years”) (reviewing SIMON LACK, THE HEDGE FUND MIRAGE: THE
ILLUSION OF BIG MONEY AND WHY IT’S TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE (2012)).
23. Id.
24. The North American Securities Administrators Association reported in
August 2012 that, for the second year in a row, Regulation D Rule 506 private
offerings were, along with real estate investment schemes, the most reported
products at the center of state securities enforcement actions. See Richard Hill,
JOBS Act Opens New Path for Scammers, NASAA Says in Annual List of Top
Schemes, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1618, 1618 (2012).
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(JOBS Act)25 in an effort to bolster another policy goal, capital
formation among smaller issuers26—who likely will target less
savvy investors than those in hedge funds. In effect, this was a
legislative effort to “jumpstart” economic activity. Although
investor protection and capital formation are both key policy
goals of federal securities laws,27 they can be in conflict. Efforts to
“ease” the burden on capital formation frequently translate into
less disclosure, reduced regulatory scrutiny, heightened fraud,
diminished investor protection, and resulting public cynicism.28
The recent SEC proposal under the JOBS Act to permit general
solicitation in connection with exempt offerings if, among other
requirements, the securities are only sold to accredited
investors29—even if, apparently, they are “publicly” offered—will
apply to hedge funds relying on exemptions under the Investment
Company Act of 1940.30 Although the advertising rules of the
Advisers Act of 194031 remain applicable to fund advisers,32 they
25. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (aiming to increase job creation and
economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging
growth companies).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2010) (detailing
the first major federal legislation to regulate the offer and sale of securities by
requiring certain disclosures to investors).
28. Cf. Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Capital Formation
from the Investor’s Perspective (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/2012/spch120312laa.htm (explaining that investor fraud is the
“black hole[] of capital formation,” so investor protection is necessary for true
capital formation through “rules to promote full and fair disclosure, reliable
financial information, and accountability for market participants”).
29. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 33-9354, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464, 54,464 (proposed Aug. 29, 2012) (“The
proposed amendment to Rule 506 would provide that the prohibition against
general solicitation and general advertising contained in Rule 502(c) of
Regulation D would not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to
Rule 506, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited
investors.”). As of February 6, 2013, no amendment to Rule 506 had been made
in this regard.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64.
31. Id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21.
32. See Richard A. Goldman et al., Amending Rule 506—Opportunities For
Private Funds, LAW360 (Sep. 07, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/
securities/articles/376400?nl_pk=f77a7383_d68a-4922-bf24-bed5 (last visited
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protect existing clients not prospective ones. It is hard to believe,
moreover, that widespread advertising will not lead to greater
interest in hedge funds among those who, although “accredited,”
do not, in their pursuit of juiced returns and the status of being
“in” a hedge fund, fully understand what they are doing and the
true nature of the risks they are taking, including the way in
which their exposure to leverage risk is elevated through the
funds’ use of debt and the great difficulty of exiting the
investment. Also, particularly challenging for investors is
understanding exactly how a fund is valuing its assets, an area in
which practices vary widely.
Whether sponsor investor-verification techniques and
enhanced industry “best practices” will successfully filter
unqualified investors lured by enticing advertising remains to be
seen. This is of great concern to state securities regulators.
Sponsors themselves are concerned about this issue. The Hedge
Fund Association has sought greater clarification from the SEC
as to how funds should verify investor accreditation, inasmuch as
the SEC’s proposed rule failed to offer a safe harbor.33 Such a rule
also would position funds to defend against charges of
wrongdoing in bringing in nonaccredited investors, by permitting
them to argue that they followed SEC guidance. Such guidance,
moreover, if given, might become a de facto industry standard,
thereby impeding development of more rigorous practices.
The hedge fund anti-fraud rule of 2007, even coupled with
the 2010 adviser registration requirement criticized by Luke, may
do little to curb likely damage to investors in an overly zealous
policy pursuit of “capital formation.” In this way, Luke’s pointed
investor protection concern on the fund-adviser front joins a
larger and longer debate over whether and how the federal
Jan. 19, 2013) (“[A]dvisers that are registered with the SEC must continue to
comply with rules relating to advertising under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See Brian Mahoney, Hedge Fund Group Wants Safe Harbor Under
Advertising Rule, LAW360 (Sept. 13, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www.
law360.com/articles/378011/print?/section=securities (last visited Jan. 19, 2013)
(“A nationwide hedge fund lobbying group on Thursday asked U.S. regulators to
create a safe harbor provision clearly stating how funds should verify the
credentials of investor-clients to whom they can now advertise, saying new
proposed rules left their obligations unclear.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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securities laws’ philosophy of full disclosure can achieve that goal
while also balancing it with other policy goals with which it
sometimes clashes.
III. Systemic Risk
If Luke is tough on investor protection, he is more generous
on systemic risk. However, although he credits the systemic risk
concerns of Dodd–Frank as worthwhile, Luke thinks adviser
registration is not necessary to advance this goal. Instead, he
argues, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can
collect pertinent data directly from fund advisers through Form
PF,34 without the intervention of the SEC. Even this more direct
approach, however, invites certain concerns.
Given the ninety-day or longer lags in receiving data,
information provided to the SEC and FSOC can be far more
unhelpfully stale than fresher “real time” data. A lot of
undetected systemic risk can develop in the meantime. This is
somewhat meliorated by an obligation to “promptly” update
specified information that becomes “materially inaccurate.”35 The
key premise, of course, is that if adverse developments occur,
managers will report them immediately, rather than later. A key
risk, however, is that managers may tend not to regard adverse
developments as material, perhaps out of simple hope and belief
that conditions will change or from a simple desire not to alert
the SEC. Moreover, one wonders whether staff at the SEC and
the FSOC can efficiently handle a large influx of data and, upon
distilling it, accurately identify disturbing aggregate trends. It is
easier in hindsight to see potentially destabilizing patterns than
it is while awash in data and searching for, but not wishing to
overreact to, possible indicators of trouble. Only time will tell on
this front.
But concerns about hedge funds’ role in systemic risk may
mask a deeper clash of interests, i.e., that between the interests
34. See Form PF Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/pfrd/pfrdfaq.shtml (last visited Jan. 31,
2013) (providing a basic overview of Form PF) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
35. SEC Implementing Release, supra note 14, at 114.
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of fund investors and the larger public interest as reflected in
systemic (social) risk concerns. Hedge funds command large pools
of capital, deploy significant leverage, engage in rapid trading
activity, and may profit from and magnify volatility.36 Whether
this creates or exacerbates unacceptable systemic (social) risk is
unclear but should be ascertained. What is clear is that funds
need investors. Thus, if funds are the sort of financial vehicle that
contributes to systemic instability, it is because the very financial
wherewithal to do so is supplied by investors. The public policy
problem, ironically, may not be to protect investors from fund
advisers but, in effect, may be to protect the financial system
from risks caused by inappropriate use of the very concentrated
capital supplied by investors. Viewed this way, hedge funds may
present less of an “adviser vs. investor” regulatory issue than a
“fund vs. society” concern.37
Here, it might be better to acknowledge outright that
mandated disclosure for systemic risk concerns is just that and
not cloak it in investor protection rhetoric. As has been noted
about the federal Bureau of Corporations, established in 1903, its
purpose similarly was aimed at “collecting industrial data and
investigating corporate trade practices as a deterrent against
illicit corporate activities.”38 The information was aimed at
consumption outside the firm, not at those investing in it.39 And
disclosure was required to deter activity that might enrich
investors, not damage them.40 As with hedge fund regulation,
then, that early 20th century disclosure law was designed to
36. See Edwards, supra note 9, at 189–91 (describing general
characteristics of hedge funds).
37. For a similar argument about early 20th century Progressive demands
for greater financial information under federal law, see Thomas W. Joo,
Comment: Corporate Governance & The “D-Word,” 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579,
1582–83 (2006).
38. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1219 (1986).
39. See Joo, supra note 37, at 1582 (“Progressives wanted disclosure
because they believed it would create accountability, not to shareholders, but to
‘the public.’”).
40. See id. at 1583 (“[T]he Bureau required a corporation’s ‘disclosure’ not
to empower or protect that corporation’s shareholders, but to discourage the
corporation from anticompetitive activity—activity that could have enriched its
shareholders.”).
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protect the public interest, not investors. This suggests a
potentially deeper clash of policy goals in adviser regulation.
What is good about hedge funds—for at least some, perhaps
many, investors—may not be good for larger social interests.
Fortunately, we can sidestep this issue for now because what
Dodd–Frank really does on the adviser regulation front is simply
mandate data collection. The requirements, although law, are
really in the nature of an extended study. The aim, paradoxically,
is to learn more about the historically opaque hedge funds and
their activities precisely to ascertain whether and how to regulate
them. It may well be concluded that no further regulatory action
is needed or even that a rollback is in order. Or, perhaps
particular areas of concern will be targeted for action. But first
we need to know how fund advisers themselves are responding,
an area in which Professor Wulf Kaal is gathering and assessing
useful data.41 Kaal’s early findings in a survey of about ninety
hedge fund managers is that the industry appears to be only
“modestly affected” by the new requirements.42 Approximately
seventy-two percent of managers reported no expected strategic
response to Dodd–Frank, with smaller funds more likely to be
affected.43 Although earnings and profits were expected to decline
due to higher compliance costs—with almost half of responding
advisers outsourcing compliance work44—seventy-five percent of
managers did not expect investor returns to suffer.45 Over forty
percent have changed their marketing materials,46 a figure that
may rise yet again if existing restrictions on advertising are
dropped, as recently proposed.47
41. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, The Effects of Hedge Fund Manager
Registration Under the Dodd–Frank Act—An Empirical Study, 50 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2150377.
42. Id. (manuscript at 59).
43. Id. (manuscript at 56); see also Wulf A. Kaal, The Effect of the Dodd–
Frank Act on the Hedge Fund Industry 41 (Feb. 2, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (asserting that certain data suggest that the compliance and
administrative costs created by the Dodd–Frank Act may disproportionally
affect smaller hedge funds) (on file with author).
44. Kaal, supra note 41 (manuscript at 42).
45. Id. (manuscript at 53).
46. Id. (manuscript at 42).
47. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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And from there, we can see what the SEC and FSOC—or
Congress—does with the new trove of data, either on the investor
protection or systemic risk fronts. Luke’s skepticism on the
former may be borne out, thereby further spotlighting the latter.
And this would then open an even more potentially disquieting
debate about the social responsibilities and legal rights of those
who facilitate rapid, large capital movements in a way that may
destabilize modern markets. Dodd–Frank certainly takes no
position on, but may set up, that far more difficult conversation.

